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INTRODUCTION
Sensory Stimulation (SS) for patients with
Disorders of Consciousness (DOC) refers
to a corpus of approaches aimed at
promoting arousal and behavioral respon-
siveness by the application of environ-
mental stimuli (Giacino, 1996). Despite
the different procedures adopted, the
method invariably includes presentation
of stimuli which are simple, frequent
and repetitive, possibly autobiographical
and with emotional content. Moreover,
stimuli are administered under multiple
sensory channels and with a moderate-
to-high intensity. SS is a low invasive,
not-dangerous, inexpensive, and simple to
apply methodology, and for these reasons,
it remains a potentially attractive reha-
bilitative method (Abbate and Mazzucchi,
2011). However, the theoretical basis of SS
has not been clearly formulated in the past,
and the method is grounded on general
assumptions derived from valid, but out-
of-date research findings (i.e., enriched
environment as a prevention of sensory
deprivation and promotion of synaptic re-
innervation and arousal). In addition up
until now there is no reliable evidence to
support, or rule out, the effectiveness of SS
in DOC patients (Lombardi et al., 2002;
Lancioni et al., 2010). Thus, even though
attractive, SS standard method seems to
need a renovation.
Recently a large body of work has
improved our knowledge about possible
residual cognitive functioning of DOC
patients. In particular, neurophysiologic
and functional brain imaging studies con-
sistently showed that a subset of DOC
patients are able to produce some covert
responses (e.g., hand movements), despite
the lack of any overt behavioral manifes-
tation (Bekinschtein et al., 2008; Cruse
et al., 2012), suggesting a preservation
of islands of high-order cognitive func-
tioning (e.g., speech processing, men-
tal imagery, etc.) (Schiff et al., 2002;
Owen et al., 2006; Coleman et al., 2007;
Owen and Coleman, 2008; Monti et al.,
2010). Furthermore, consciousness mech-
anisms have been recently associated to
new notions as distributed information
(Tononi, 2004), interacting cortical areas
and brain connectivity (Laureys, 2005;
Rosanova et al., 2012). Consciousness is
viewed as the capacity of a system to inte-
grate information and it seems to depend
on the brain’s ability to support com-
plex activity patterns distributed among
interacting cortical areas (Tononi, 2004;
Laureys, 2005; Dehaene and Changeux,
2011; Rosanova et al., 2012; Casali et al.,
2013)1.
The aim of the present article is to
evaluate if the main characteristics of SS
method would still be appropriate, taking
into account recent research findings and
theoretical views elaborated on DOCs. In
the case of inadequacies we suggest some
possible modifications to the SS method
which allow for improvements in light of
new findings.
MAIN FEATURES OF SS STANDARD
METHOD
SIMPLICITY
SS programs are based on the idea that
to avoid sensory deprivation you should
1In the text we’ll use the broad term “integration” to
address indistinctly these last concepts.
organize an enriched environment which
can promote neural plasticity (Di and
Schnakers, 2012). However, following the
tacit hypothesis that DOC patients have
reduced attention capacities and that sim-
ple stimulation is less demanding in terms
of cognitive processing, several SS pro-
tocols used simple and often meaning-
less stimulations. Yet simple stimulations
might not be appropriate considering
that DOC patients can be engaged in
structured tasks and may have preserved
complex responses suggesting islands of
preserved high-order cognitive function-
ing (Lancioni et al., 2008, 2011). Our
hypothesis is that these islands could be
the target of a SS protocol. If so, a simple
and meaningless stimulation could be less
efficient in engaging the patient preserved
cognition with respect to a more struc-
tured and meaningful stimulation. This
hypothesis would seem to be supported by
a previous fMRI study showing a marked
reduced cortical response to linguistically
meaningless auditory stimuli with respect
to meaningful stimuli in DOC patients
(Schiff et al., 2005). Consequently, the
use of structured and meaningful stimuli
would appear to be a valuable option for
SS programs (Table 1).
FREQUENCY/REPETITION/INTENSITY
SS programs usually consist of presenting
a repetitive, frequent, and moderate-to-
high intensity simple stimulation. If the
aim of SS is to promote patient’s behav-
ioral responsiveness and cognitive process-
ing, the concept of Habituation is against
these type of protocols (Thompson, 2009).
Habituation is in fact defined as a behav-
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Table 1 | Revision of the main features of the SS standard method and suggestions for possible improvements.
SS features Limitations Advantages Possible improvements
Simplicity Preserved islands of high-order
cognitive processing not engaged
Complex stimulation including
structured and meaningful stimuli
Frequency and repetition Habituation No repetitive and frequent
stimulation
Moderate-to-high intensity Habituation? Attention triggered by stimuli with
strong energy and sharp onset
Appropriate intensity stimulation,
occasionally interspersed with
high intensity stimulation
Unimodal stimulation Attentional sources not captured
Preserved islands of high-order
cognitive processing not engaged
Integrated and simultaneous
multisensory stimulation
Emotional salience Processing of emotional
information prioritized in cognitive
system
Integration promoted
Emotional stimulation
Autobiographical content Integration and consciousness
promoted
The same advantages as
emotional processing
Autobiographical stimulation
Input processing Possible covert answers not
advocated
Requests for exhibiting behavioral
responses or performing actions
Artificial setting Absence of emotional salience
Absence of autobiographical
content
See limitations for simplicity,
repetition, and input processing
Naturalistic and dynamic actions
in real or virtual context
ioral and neuronal response decrement
that results from repeated stimulation
(Rankin et al., 2009), therefore a SS
procedure organized as repetition of the
same stimulus is logically not the best way
to maximize the probability of an engage-
ment of cognitive processes during a stim-
ulation protocol. The same conclusion
can be held true if we look at the fre-
quency characteristic. Classical studies on
Habituation suggest that “more frequent
stimulation results in more rapid and/or
more pronounced response decrement”
(Rankin et al., 2009). On the other hand,
considering the intensity characteristic,
some authors suggest that Habituation
does not emerge for very intense stim-
uli (Rankin et al., 2009), while others
that it emerges also with intense stimu-
lation (Ritter et al., 1968; Ponce et al.,
2011). On this point, it seems relevant
to us that the observations that stimuli
with strong energy and sharp onsets can
activate attention mechanisms can also be
seen to lower the threshold for conscious
perception (Dehaene et al., 2006).
UNIMODAL STIMULI
A typical SS approach is defined as mul-
timodal because it usually involves the
stimulation of many different sensory
modalities (e.g., visual, auditory, tactile,
etc.). However, stimuli used are uni-
modal in nature and sensory channels
are stimulated one by one in a standard
SS session. Thus, the stimuli in SS are
never really multisensory and the method
fundamentally provides a serial imple-
mentation of different unimodal stimu-
lations. Cognitive neuroscience research
in Multisensory integration seems to sug-
gest that unimodal SS is not a valuable
option for SS. Several studies suggest
that attention tends to orient more eas-
ily toward sensory inputs that possess
multisensory properties and that this
happens automatically (Talsma et al.,
2010). Moreover, different lines of research
in neurophysiology suggest that brain cor-
tical processing is multisensory not just
in associative cortices but also in pri-
mary cortices (Ghazanfar and Schroeder,
2006). Taken together, this evidence sug-
gests, from a cognitive and a neurophysio-
logical view, that multisensory stimuli are
a valuable option for SS because maybe
they are better at capturing attentional
sources of DOC patients and in engag-
ing their preserved island of high-order
cortical functioning.
EMOTIONAL SALIENCE
Stimuli with emotional salience are a valu-
able option for SS.
Firstly, the processing of emotional
information is prioritized in cognitive sys-
tem (Pessoa, 2005; Vuilleumier, 2005). In
particular, emotional stimuli receive priv-
ileged access to attention and awareness
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(capture of attention) (Phelps, 2006).
Moreover, sensory processing is enhanced
by emotion (Vuilleumier, 2005). In addi-
tion, emotion can influence the encoding
of to-be-remembered stimuli and arousal
is proposed to enhance hippocampal-
dependent consolidation (Phelps, 2006).
Finally, emotional salience may influ-
ence also high-level representations as
thoughts and actions (Vuilleumier, 2005).
Advantages for emotional against neu-
tral stimuli had been originally found
with unpleasant emotional content, how-
ever, some similar findings have been
recently confirmed also with pleasant con-
tent (Lang and Bradley, 2010).
Secondly, emotional processing could
favor integration. The notion of the auton-
omy of emotional processing, for which it
would be largely automatic and take place
independently of top-down factors such
as attention, task context, and conscious
awareness, has been recently challenged
(Pessoa, 2005, 2008). Studies have in fact
shown that amygdalae functions in a man-
ner that is closely tied to top-down factors
(Pessoa, 2005, 2008), and that neural cir-
cuitry of emotion and cognition interact
from early perception to decision making
and reasoning (Phelps, 2006). Amygdalae
has been hypothesized to be a strong can-
didate for integrating cognitive and emo-
tional information, considering that is one
of the most connected regions of the brain
(Pessoa, 2009).
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL CONTENT
Stimuli with autobiographical content
are valuable options for SS. Firstly, the
retrieval of autobiographical memo-
ries (AM) involves multiple processes,
i.e., episodic memory, personal seman-
tic knowledge, visual imagery, emotional
processing, self-referential and con-
trol executive processes (Cabeza and
St Jacques, 2007; Piolino et al., 2009),
and accordingly engages a large net-
work of brain regions (predominantly
left-lateralized and medial brain regions)
(Svoboda et al., 2006). Therefore AM seem
to be a proper candidate to promote
integration. Secondly, AM are inher-
ently personal and are characterized by
varying gradients of emotional content
(Svoboda et al., 2006). As a consequence
they encompass the advantages from
emotional processing. Finally, AM are
strictly related to consciousness. In par-
ticular, the episodic component of AM
are coupled with an high level of con-
sciousness defined “autonoetic” (Tulving,
2002; Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2011).
As a result, stimulating AM could promote
consciousness.
INPUT PROCESSING
Overall SS addresses the input process-
ing. It was in fact limited to stimu-
late perception, or at most the memory
and emotional processing associated with
some percepts. On the contrary, the find-
ing of “covert responses” exhibited by
some DOC patients supports the view
that a new SS should be aimed at stim-
ulating both input and output processing
(Bekinschtein et al., 2008; Cruse et al.,
2012). If covert responses are possible, we
could be authorized to invite the patient
to perform actions or complex behaviors
during SS even when any overt response
is not actually exhibited. Furthermore, in
doing so, we could pass from a gen-
eral stimulation that promote arousal to
a rehabilitation that promotes and rein-
forces definite behavioral responses by
repetitions and exercise. Speaking about
brain plasticity, virtually every experi-
ence (perception included) has the poten-
tial to alter the brain and also produc-
ing enduring changes (Kolb and Gibb,
2008). However, it is becoming clear that
many experience-dependent changes are
highly specific (Kolb and Gibb, 2008).
Consequently, a stimulation limited to
perception alone could promote only cir-
cumscribed brain changes, while larger
outcomes would be expected by stim-
ulating both the input and the output
processing. Accordingly, complex-housing
method, which includes social stimula-
tion, SS, and increased motor activity,
promotes the greatest benefit to lab ani-
mals with injury at any age (Kolb and
Gibb, 2008). In addition, a recent the-
ory of action representation regards the
action as the core of larger representational
networks (Hommel and Elsner, 2009).
Accordingly, a new SS addressing also the
output processing or actions could pro-
mote integration.
ARTIFICIAL SETTING
The SS typical setting is quite artificial,
and looks like a lab where controlled
stimuli are administered. This context
predisposes to select simple and repetitive
stimuli, often without emotional salience
and autobiographical content, and aimed
to stimulate only the input processing. We
believe that naturalistic, dynamic actions
in an appropriate context aimed at select-
ing specific behavioral scripts (e.g., having
breakfast with the family) could represent
a better choice for a renewed SS (Lancioni
et al., 2014). Naturalistic tasks in real or
virtual situations involve complex stimuli,
call both for input and output processing,
and are ideal backgrounds for introduc-
ing emotional and autobiographical stim-
uli. Interestingly, some studies showed that
complex and dynamic naturalistic actions
can be efficiently assessed by means of
a behavioral test (Schwartz et al., 2002)
and functional brain imaging (Hugo and
Maguire, 2007; Hasson et al., 2009).
CONCLUSIONS
SS standard method is clearly out-of-date
and is in need of an overhaul (Abbate
and Mazzucchi, 2011). We believe that
the new concepts of “covert response”
(Bekinschtein et al., 2008), “preserved
islands of high-order cognitive func-
tioning” (Owen and Coleman, 2008),
and “integration favoring the awareness”
(Rosanova et al., 2012) could be a use-
ful theoretical basis for developing a
renewed approach to SS. Our revision of
SS method, based on the mentioned con-
cepts, has showed that many of its features
actually could not facilitate the cogni-
tive processing in DOC patients (Table 1).
Conversely, the rationale for applying
emotional and autobiographical stimuli
has been confirmed. In this article we
propose some possible directions for the
future based on the concepts of complex
stimulation (Di Stefano et al., 2012). This
would involve structured and meaningful
stimuli that would be delivered to multi-
ple sensory channels in an integrated and
simultaneous way. It would address both
input and output cognitive processing and
involve dynamic and naturalistic actions
that would avoid meaningless repeti-
tive and frequent stimulations (Lancioni
et al., 2014). This would, therefore,
include stimulations with proper inten-
sity which would be occasionally inter-
spersed with intense stimuli. All of these
actions wouldmaintain the valid aspects of
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emotional salience and autobiographical
relevance.
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